Krešimir Božić
Author: Ina Vukić
Two weeks out of general elections and still no government formed in Croatia. According to legislative provisions the President of Croatia Zoran Milanovic is to convene the first session of the newly elected parliament by 20th May 2024 at the latest regardless of whether post-elections negotiations reach the required 76 seats to form a government.
A bird’s eye view at this stage tells us that the main stumbling block for HDZ/Croatian Democratic Union in mustering the 76 parliamentary seats needed to form government is the fact that Homeland Movement/DP party, considered in the mix of forming government with HDZ, absolutely rejects to be in a coalition with SDSS (Independent Democratic Serbian Party), which has been HDZ’s partner in Andrej Plenkovic’s HDZ government along with other 5 ethnic minorities’ seats since the start, i.e. since 2016. The ethnic minorities group, that make up 8 of 151 seats in parliament, have rejected the proposal circulated by the Croatian media last week that they, without the SDSS 3 seats, join HDZ coalition with Homeland Movement.
“Things are going well, we had good constructive talks. All talks continue next week. The winners will form the Government and keep the activities we have had so far. We talked about the issue of ethnic minorities, we talked about everything. You will hear everything. We will have more than enough hands (seats in Parliament). There will be more than enough hands, we are not turning our backs on anyone. It is always important that you have 76 serious and reliable people,” stated acting prime minister Andrej Plenkovic at a public function in the town on Pula on Saturday 4 May.
It remains to be seen whether any of the three elements in this formula – HDZ, Homeland Movement, SDSS – will make any compromises and concessions in order to form a government. It certainly appears that this will be the case and if it actuates then a great deal of disappointment in the voter pools will ensue and a short life of that new government almost guaranteed.
Having lived most of my life in Australia, which is a multicultural and multiethnic country that boasts fantastic success as a unified nation within this social fabric, I know that ethnic minorities do not need to have a dedicated space in parliamentary rows of seats to ensure their rights and specific needs are met. Dedicated government departments and Commissions are in place to do this job and do it well. The same scenario is found in most developed democracies.
Having said this, a presence of politically organised ethnic minority groups that focus in their politics on the country of their origin rather than on national interests of the country they are living in as ethnic minority is often viewed as and results as a source of instability or conflict within a democracy. And to my view and view of an enormous ethnic majority in Croatia that view is correct simply because the section of Serb ethnic minority seeking and succeeding at general elections within SDSS political party are those ethnic Serbs in Croatia heavily personally and ideologically aligned and associated with the rebel Serbs who actively pursued genocidal aggression against Croats in Croatia and have since the 1990’s war pursued the political and active path of denying the character of Serb aggression against Croatia and equating the victim with the aggressor. This being the case I cannot compare this situation to any other former communist countries in Europe. Croatia has politically active and politically powerful Serb minority which barracks for Serbia’s national interests rather than Croatia’s. It is evident that the Serbs standing behind that part of the Serb ethnic minority have not accepted Croatian independence nor any responsibility for the genocidal aggression. If instead of SDSS Croatian government was in coalition with the part of Serb minority that fought with Croatia against Serb aggression in the Homeland War, then one could truly say that ethnic minority rights and needs would be better catered for. This way only the political needs of some, in every form, are being met as opposed the needs of the entire Serbian ethnic minority in Croatia.
The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 became the foundation of democratisation of countries in Europe who had swiftly moved from communist authoritarian regimes to reasonably functioning democracies based on competitive political systems with the rotation of power in accordance with results from general elections. Most of these countries made this transition smoothly, without war or military or police conflicts. But not Croatia. It’s 94% of voters who voted for secession from communist Yugoslavia in 1991 were faced with brutal and barbaric military and genocidal aggression from the Yugoslav People’s Army (with Serbian nationals at its top echelons) and rebel Serbs living in Croatia who wanted no Croatian independence. The history holds it well recorded that the Croatian military, political and volunteer forces succeeded in a magnificent victory in 1995 when Croatia won the war.
However, almost immediately after the death of President Franjo Tudjman in December 1999 the general elections of early 2000, when former communists won government, the grapes of envisaged full democracy started to sour in Croatia. This was the time when former communists in Croatia were on a vicious rampage to criminalise Croatia’s defence from Yugoslav/Serb aggression. This was the time when several Croatian military generals and other high-ranking officers were falsely accused of war crimes and sent to the International Criminal court in the Hague (declared innocent of the war crimes charges years later) and others forcibly retired. This was the time when former communist Yugoslavia was breathing its second wind into Croatia. No wonder voter-depression and debilitating anger set in on the patriotic side, stopping many from voting at elections, and former communists won government and set about attacking Croatian patriotism. Just like the communist party of former Yugoslavia did. It was Ivica Racan’s government that pursued open and public support from the SDSS in 2003. To the view of many political analysts, including myself, this was a buffer to sensitise the Croatian public gradually into living with a new reality in which the Serb aggressor’s politics would be introduced as some kind of an ethnic minority right in Croatia! It was HDZ Ivo Sanader’s government that in 2007 made SDSS a coalition partner in Croatia’s government. Who else could bring such a cruel blow against the Croatian people and its Homeland War veterans but a prime minister contaminated from head to toe with corruption. A criminal of large proportions, serving prison for the past several years for corruption during his time as prime minister. When in 2009 after the fall of Ivo Sanader amidst corruption scandals Jadranka Kosor headed the Croatian HDZ government SDSS continued in a government supporting role and this continued to 2011 when Zoran Milanovic of SDP (Social Democratic Party) took over the government post general elections. After that SDSS was given an active role in government, including deputy prime ministership, especially when Andrej Plenkovic entered the scene as prime minister of Croatia in 2016.
In the time since year 2000 Croatian voters, albeit in weak turnout numbers, elected leaders and parties that explicitly pursued pluralism in favour of SDSS, undermined independent media via inserting media control, and failed to curb plaguing judicial oversights and judicial bias, establishing a semblance of illiberal democracy even though they called it liberal democracy. This democratic backsliding away from the planned democracy that was present at the inception of independence from communist Yugoslavia pursuits has for Croatia contributed significantly to the terrible and essentially unproductive or inadequate transition from the former communist regime.
This democratic backsliding or relapsing into bad ways as seen through the eyes of transitioning from communism into democracy has seen a great deal of anger and disappointment within the Croatian community that fought for independence. It has become an insidious cancer wound preventing progression with the values of the Homeland War of 1990’s. The fact that about additional 500,000 of voters in the 2024 general elections voted, evidently in efforts to change this democratic backsliding tide, speaks volumes on the fact that political crisis continues. Political analysists worldwide would have us believe that democratic backsliding tends to take place in societies without ethnic mobilisation – where ethnic minorities are politically insignificant. But Croatia serves as an example to the opposite. I.E., that political backsliding can occur in a country where important and politically mobilised ethnic groups are active and given large political and social space to pursue their ambitions and goals in undermining the importance of ethnic majority and its political and social pursuits. While there are 22 ethnic minorities in Croatia including Serb, Czech, Slovak, Italian, Hungarian, Jew, German, Austrian, Ukrainian, Eastern Slavs, Bosniak, Slovenian, Montenegrin, Macedonian, Russian, Bulgarian, Polish, Roma, Romanian, Turkish, Vlach, Albanian and others, all of which enjoy full rights as Croatian citizens, it is the section of Serb minority organised under the SDSS banner that appear as the main culprits for the democratic backslide in Croatia. They appear as the only ethnic minority in Croatia who actively pursue the interests of Serbia and its politics as their identity rather than Croatian citizenship.
The interplay between ethnic politics and political competition in Croatia is riddled with SDSS’s pursuits in making righteous the murderous actions of 1990’s rebel Serbs to stop Croatian independence any which way, even by mass murder and utter destruction of anything that was Croatian. This aspect of politics in Croatia has caused an incremental decay of democracy and national pride in Croatia. This decay or backsliding can be seen on several fronts that are central to democratic progress such as the political front, legal or judicial front, and the psychological one. With mainstream media control, with dysfunctional judiciary in terms of independence from politics and with continued undemocratic pursuits brought over from communist Yugoslavia, such as nepotism and large-scale corruption coupled with misguided and ad hoc steps towards the goal of reconciliation between the victim and the aggressor of the 1990’s War, significant authoritarianism has flowed into daily lives and governance in Croatia since 2000. This being the case it is unlikely that the shift from the undemocratic pursuits and public psychology which struggles a great deal because the governments have failed to condemn the former communist regime and ban its symbols will occur all at once. However, there is ample support within the Croatian society and within the political life of Croatia for the notion of shedding SDSS from the government and replacing it, if a minority or coalition government must be formed, which is the case for Croatia, with political currents that place the will and skills for the entrenchment of Croatian national interests at the forefront.
“The strategies of backsliding leaders and parties more globally are by now well documented. The leaders entrench themselves in political office, insulating themselves from changes in the preferences of the electorate. They shape the preferences of the electorate by degrading the public sphere through misinformation and hate speech. They seek to undermine the rule of law through nepotism and the allocation of opportunities to wealthy cronies, and then attack the independent, rule-bound bureaucracy. Through these steps, they undermine constitutional checks and balances through a combination of capture and bypassing those who oppose them; and they also try to control the election machinery itself…”, Tom Ginsburg and Aziz Z. Huq, 2022.
The above quote may be seen as a true reflection of what is and has for the past two decades been occurring on the Croatian political scene. The political backsliders would form a group of people in politics seeking power and position for their personal advancement. They are called the “uhljebi,” people who have become public sector employees, elected officials and parliamentarians through a nepotistic relationship or political party affiliation, normally without the required skills or qualifications for that position or role. Uhljebljenje is heavily associated with the Croatian post-communist/socialist “economy of favours” and its evidently widespread crony capitalism, whereby it is common to place a client relative into a position of responsibility that ‘feeds’ his family while also benefitting the patron. Similar practices can be observed in other transitional societies in Europe post Berlin Wall fall and, hence, a constant barrage of new political parties and populist politicians emerging in attempts to lead Croatia away from these oppressive practices. Most of them rising so that they can be shut down through the controlled media apparatus and organised “uhljeb” networks that extend their tentacles all the way down to the voters.
In Croatia, out of all the ethnic minorities the Serb SDSS emerges as the unfettered one. The important role it has been given via appointments to positions of power such as deputy prime ministership, have led to Serb ethnic particularism that undermines Croatian national identity, collective interests and impairs democracy. While it is expected that ethnic minorities stay keen on self-preservation it is one thing to ensure the rights of ethnic minorities and it is another to permit ethnic minorities to constantly bombard the foundations of Croatian democracy which are embedded in the Homeland War victory. The deadlock in the pursuit of transitioning from communist Yugoslavia into a functional full democracy that has plagued Croatia for at least two decades would best be resolved if the new government was formed without the SDSS as its partner. Ina Vukic
